A commentary on decision-making and organisational legitimacy in the Risk Society by Benn, S et al.
 1 
       
12. A Commentary on Decision-making and Organisational Legitimacy in 
the Risk Society. 
 
Suzanne Benna, Paul Brownb and Andrea North-Samardzicc 
Abstract 
Key concepts of Risk Society as elaborated by Ulrich Beck and others (Beck, 1992; Beck, 
1995; Beck, 1999; Giddens, 1994; Beck, Giddens and Lash1994; Beck, Bonss and Lau, 
2003) are illuminated though a case study of managed environmental risk, namely the 
Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) controversy at Botany, a southeast suburb of Sydney. We 
observe the way multiple stakeholder decision-making plays out a number of Risk Society 
themes, including the emergence of ‘unbounded risk’ and of highly ‘individualised’ and 
‘reflexive’ risk communities. Across several decades, the events of the HCB story support 
Risk Society predictions of legitimacy problems faced by corporations as they harness 
technoscientific support for innovation in their products and industrial processes without due 
recognition of social and environmental risk. Tensions involving identity, trust and access to 
expert knowledge advance our understanding of democratic ‘sub-political’ decision making 
and ways of distributing environmental risk. 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
For more than two decades, a number of European sociologists have explicated the 
relationship between society and the natural environment through the lens of Risk Society 
theory (Beck, 1992; Beck, 1995; Beck, 1999; Giddens, 1994; Beck, Giddens and Lash1994; 
Beck Bonss and Lau, 2003; and others). This paper comments on how key concepts of Risk 
Society theory are inflected through stakeholder management of environmental risk 
associated with the management of over 10,000 tonnes of Hexachlorobenze (HCB) stored at 
the Orica chemicals plant in southeastern Sydney. The paper is best read in conjunction with 
other contributions in this special issue.   
 
1.1 Stages of Risk Society 
Risk Society theory has been highly influential on current perceptions of the relationship 
between nature and social life and organisation. Rather than relegating the natural 
environment to the natural sciences, Risk Society takes a conceptual leap by linking social 
awareness of environmental issues to a diminishing trust in the leading institutions of 
modernity. In Risk Society as elaborated by Beck and others (Beck, 1992; Beck, 1995; Beck, 
1999; Giddens, 1994; Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994; Beck Bonss and Lau, 2003), 
preoccupations and perceptions of risk are very different to those of early periods of 
modernity and pre-modernity. In pre-modernity, risks took the form of unavoidable natural 
hazards, while in classical industrial societies risks are seen as contingent on the actions of 
individuals and wider social forces (Goldblatt, 1996). By placing responsibility for risks in 




According to Risk Society theorists, contemporary risks that result from scientific and 
technological advances differ markedly from what is characterised in Beck’s recent writings 
as ‘simple or first modern society’ (Beck et al, 2003: 28). As environmental risks are 
irreversible and cumulative they are seen to be more catastrophic than previous eras.  Often 
they are imperceptible to human senses, are global in scale, and can act far from their origins 
(Beck, 1992). Attributing causality becomes problematic as the cause/ effect relationship is 
uncertain and contested. According to Beck (1992), once blame cannot be attributed, 
institutions become less important as the mechanism to cope with and mitigate risks. As a 
result, the role of modern institutions is increasingly challenged, with challenge eventually 
shifting to conflict between sections of society concerning environmental risks (Benn 2004).   
 
Meanwhile risk decisions are opened up to a wider array of participants, outside of the 
traditional experts and regulators, to include individual citizens and has been opened up to a 
wider array of participants, outside of the traditional experts and regulators, to include 
outsider stakeholders, individual citizens and organisations, associations and movements 
(Beck, 1992; Matten, 2004). Shifts both in the themes and participants in the risk discourse 
indicate the transition from ‘first modern society’ to the ‘Risk Society.’  
 
Beck et al (2003) argue that as well as changes to social structures, (in large measure making 
them work for citizens, rather than above citizens) there is a revolution concerning the very 
notions of change itself.  This revolution is due to the processes of reflexive modernisation . 
According to Beck: 
 4 
What is meant by that is not reflection on modernisation but ‘reflexivity’ in the 
sense of the unintentional, often unseen, calling into question, changing and 
cancellation of modernization by itself’ (Beck, 1998: 132). 
  
Reflexive modernisation is creating a distinct ‘second wave’ of modernisation associated 
with increasing awareness that control over contemporary versions of risk is impossible. In 
the ‘second wave’, attitudes towards problem-solving and the responses of institutions to 
risks and hazards reveal the inadequacy of current systems in terms of managing these new 
forms of risk. The unquestioned assumptions that formed the foundations of modernity are 
now being examined in terms of their rationality; it is this second-order rationalisation or 
reflexivity where practical knowledge is constantly revisable that is the hallmark of reflexive 
modernisation.  It is the process that is driving the shift to the Risk Society. 
 
Beck (1995) draws these concepts together to classify the Risk Society into stages.  In its first 
stage, society attempts to implement controls or eliminate the risks through traditional 
institutional or economic means; in the second stage, confronted by a mounting institutional 
crisis, there is an attempt to implement more transformative change (Adams, 2001).The 
emergence of these 'manufactured' uncertainties (Giddens, 1994) is forcing society to rethink 
political and organisational structures and behaviour in order to better deal with these risks 
(Beck, 1992; Beck,1994; Beck,1997; Beck, 1999). As a result of the processes of reflexive 
modernisation, it is argued, modernity itself is challenged. 
 
1.2 Boundaries of choice 
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Recently Beck and colleagues have analysed the ‘meta-changes’ in theory and institutions of 
the Risk Society through the lens of boundaries: between scientific and unscientific forms of 
knowledge, between the social and the natural and between social spheres in general (Beck 
et al 2003). In their words, this period can be characterised in terms of the following features 
concerning boundaries (2003: 19): 
1. ‘Boundaries cease to be given and instead become choices. Drawing boundaries 
becomes optional. 
2. Simultaneous with that, there is a multiplication of the plausible ways in which 
boundaries can be drawn, as well as ways they can be drawn into doubt 
3. The existence of multiple boundaries changes not only the collectivity defined by 
them but the nature of the boundaries themselves’. 
Rather than the postmodern conception of dissolved boundaries, in this period  traditional 
boundaries multiply and dissolve, but are replaced by pragmatically determined, temporary 
boundaries that are socially selected and optional.  
 
In this more recently developed concept of the ‘fictive’ boundary, Beck builds on his earlier 
characterisation of ‘sub-political’ decision-making arrangements. His understanding of ‘sub-
politics’ refers to the temporary, multiple stakeholder decentralized and flexible 
arrangements and networks that he argues are increasingly taking over decision-making and 
are sites of legitimation and action in the Risk Society (Beck, 1997; Little, 2000). Examples 
are task forces, consultative committees and other such forms operating outside the 
traditional representative arena. Other writers (such as Dryzek, 1995; 1997; and Giddens 
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1994) also see democratic potential in these arrangements. It is the boundaries of such forms 





Risk Society theory makes broad claims concerning the delegitimation of the traditional 
leading institutions of modernity, such as corporation, state and the law, as a result of their 
perceived inability to deal with modernisation threats. In a reflexive, constantly shifting and 
multiple stakeholder arena, individuals and individual organizations are now returned to 
power in what Beck (1997: 98) has termed the 'non-institutional renaissance of politics'.  The 
devaluation of modern institutions capability to manage the new themes of the risk discourse 
and expert knowledge has also impacted on the role of the individual.  The increased access 
to knowledge on risk and the heightened degree of choice have imposed upon us what Boyd 
considers to be a ‘new burden of risk assessment’ (2003: 101), whereby individuals are 
engaging in the social construction of counter-expertise.  This is what Beck (1999) terms 
‘individualization’ and what Giddens (1994) refers to as ‘the disembedding of social 
institutions. 
 
The notion of individualization is conceptualised as the other side of the coin of reflexivity.  
As traditional norms and expectations, the power of modern institutions and knowledge of 
experts are called into question by reflexive modernisation, individuals are adopting the 
responsibility of seeking and inventing new certainties for themselves (Tulloch and Lupton, 
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2003; Goldblatt, 1996).  Self-transformation occurs through the impact of both 
individualization and globalisation – the result is a loss of legitimacy for traditional 
institutions (Beck, 1999). 
 
But this important concept of individualization, argued by Bauman (1993) to be Beck's most 
profound insight, is controversial and has been little examined empirically. Some scholars, 
for instance, argue that awareness raising through individualization of responsibility does not 
necessarily translate into empowered action.  While the public is given a voice in decision-
making processes in the new risk discourse and thus the opportunity to provide counter-
expertise (Boyne, 2003), this voice may mean little if the public is not granted the power to 
enforce their opinions. The micro level actors may provide input in the decision-making 
process to treat the situation but unless there is collaboration between them, may not have the 
capacity to address the situation directly.   
 
Risk Society theory has generated useful insights in a number of discourses: the sociology of 
risk (Irwin, 2001; Wynne, 1996), 'ecocentric' business models (Shrivastava, 1995), and 
changing forms of business communication, corporate responsibility and citizen participation 
(Demetrious, 2002; Livesey, 2001; Tsoukas, 1999). But while reflexive modernisation, Risk 
Society and individualization theories offer persuasive insights into the growing public 
concern for the effects of industrialisation on human health and that of the natural 
environment (Irwin, 2001; Wynne, 1994), they have been given little detailed empirical 
examination and a number of scholars have requested more evidence (e.g. Parkin, 1998). As 
Schlosberg (1999), a leading writer on environmental justice, puts it, Beck has paid little 
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attention to finding real world case studies that demonstrate his theories.  Having said that, 
Risk Society and its linked theories of individualization and reflexive modernity are highly 
complex concepts. In the case analysis in the following sections of the paper, we have 
therefore selected those aspects of these theories that can best explain the events of the case.   
 
2.0 Approach and Case Study 
 
This paper explores Risk Society themes through the HCB case study. In conjunction with 
evidence accumulated elsewhere in this volume, our empirical material derives from 
interviews with stakeholder representatives and independent observers, from documentary 
analysis, and from participant observation in stakeholder meetings held to negotiate 
management of the environmental risk.  
 
The central issue of the case material analysed from various perspectives through this 
volume is the disposal of the 10,000 tonnes of HCB waste stored at the Botany Bay site of 
the Orica chemicals company in Sydney, Australia.  It is the largest stockpile of this highly 
toxic organochlorine in the world, and responsibility for management of this waste is a 
highly contested issue, reflecting many of the key challenges characterising the broader 
concept of environmental sustainability. These challenges are such that three to four decades 
after the production of the waste, there is still no resolution on disposal location or 
methodology. An important phase of the dispute has been Orica’s attempt to gain approval 
for an on-site treatment plant using the ‘Geomelt’ process (Brown, this volume). This ended 
in 2004 with the New South Wales State Government rejecting this proposal, and requiring 
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Orica to find an alternative site in an unpopulated area. At the time of writing, no such site 
has been identified, and the option of exporting the waste to a European facility has become 
the latest, highly controversial, proposal (Brown, this volume; Rae and Brown, this volume). 
 
As Rae and Brown point out, a number of different bodies formed to guide this decision-
making have emerged since the Australian government rejected high temperature 
incineration as an option for the destruction of organochlorines in 1992. These bodies have 
included a National Advisory Body ( to the Australian Government), a Community 
Participation and Review Committee (CPRC) legislated for under the HCB Management 
Plan, a NSW Commission of Inquiry and an Independent Expert Panel, commissioned by 
the NSW Government. The conflicting attitudes of the many stakeholders involved in and 
represented by these bodies, compounded as they are by the scientific uncertainties 
associated with the alternative waste technologies and their impacts, are recorded in the 
papers in this volume. A key point in the lack of resolution of this dispute is not just that 
these voices are in conflict but that they represent the bounded rationality and identity of the 
various stakeholder groups. For instance, Benn and Jones (this volume) note that Orica’s 
identity as a leading techno-scientific organisation is a source of power and legitimacy and 
therefore very much at stake in the negotiations as to whether disposal should take place on 
its site, under its stewardship. In a similar vein, local community groups have an identity 
forged by a history of worker/ company relations in the local area and a rationality shaped by 
Orica’s somewhat opaque previous community relations policies. Meanwhile Greenpeace, 
important as a key peak NGO involved in toxic waste issues at the Orica site, has an identity 
fixed by its traditional opposition to the transport of toxic waste. (However we can note that 
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since the decision to abandon Geomelt on site at Botany, new Greenpeace focus on climate 
change issues effectively precludes its active campaigning on the HCB issue). 
 
The challenges concerning disposal of the waste are also underpinned by changing social 
understandings of the role and nature of both expert knowledge and public participation in 
decision-making concerning environmental risk. Indeed one of the key outcomes of the case 
study is that Orica has been firmly placed as responsible for the wastes and as owners of the 
associated risks, but not as the final authority on how the wastes should be managed. Instead, 
that authority is dispersed across a range of decision forming structures, with the State 
Government having final say, ultimately through licencing arrangements. For example, when 
the New South Wales government ordered Orica to investigate other sites, it established an 
Independent Panel of three experts which continues to review and advise on all options. And 
considerable power also resides outside both company and government. For example,  
community members of the CPRC, charged under legislation to review the decision-making, 
have exerted strong political suasion: They rejected the advice of an independent expert 
which they themselves engaged, (though he was paid for by Orica), and  they challenged the 
legitimacy of Orica’s various public for a called during the environmental impact assessment 
process. As the firm acknowledges itself, this complexity sees the company reforming its 
public consultation and community engagement techniques and policies, as a precondition 
for decision making.  
 
To sum this up, several contributing authors (for example Rae and Brown, this volume) have 
noted the inability of various levels of government to locate an appropriate role for 
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themselves in the decision-making. In contrast, the dispute highlights the power that 
community-based organisations can marshal, particularly with the support of informal 
networks and information systems. Hence we see the key argument of the community 
representatives on the CPRC that the waste should not be destroyed in a highly populated 
area winning through.  
 
3.0 Risk Society Themes and HCB in Botany 
 
In categorising our qualitative data, we established the following themes related to the 
multiple stakeholder decision-making described in this case:  
1. perceived type and source of risk,  
2. power relations among stakeholders in the allocation of environmental risks,  
3. public participation, policy and regulation 
4. the role played by expert knowledge, 
Table 1 compares the guiding factors of multiple stakeholder decision-making concerning 
environmental risk in conditions of industrial society to those in the two 'stages' of the Risk 
Society.  
Table 1 here 
 
In our analysis, we firstly tabulate the understandings of industrial society and Risk Society 
held by Beck and other Risk Society theorists theory according to these themes (See Table 
1). We then compare these prescriptions with the observed events of the case study. We 
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recognise the complexity of Risk Society theory and that it is impossible to capture in its 
entirety in this paper. But these key concepts are selected as they best explain the empirical 
case study. 
 
3.1 Perceived type and source of risk 
 
Two decades of frustrated decision-making concerning the disposal of the HCB waste 
stored at Orica illustrate key characteristics of the Risk Society. The waste itself was 
generated in association with ‘scientific breakthroughs’ of the industrial phase of 
organic chemistry. The struggle during the 1980s to reform the industrial system 
responsible for the production of toxic risk in Australia are characteristic of Stage 1 of the 
Risk Society. Largely as a result of the formation of a Community Participation and Review 
Committee (CPRC), with representatives from individual members of the community as 
well as environmental, industry and government representatives, individual actors became 
increasingly informed concerning the causes and nature of environmental risk. The role and 
responsibilities of the CPRC is a reflection of outside movements and associations 
becoming engaged in the decision-making process about risks, a characteristic of the 
move towards the Risk Society.  
 
Both heightened perceptions of risk and the source of the risk in the Orica episode 
display characteristics of Stage 2 of the Risk Society. The rhetorical contest (Livesey, 
2001) concerning disposal of the toxic waste reflects the struggle that corporations and 
government face as they are confronted by a reflexive public, newly aware of the 
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dangers associated with industrial organic chemistry. Not only is HCB itself now widely 
recognised as highly toxic but the new disposal technologies for organochlorines such 
as HCB potentially produce toxic emissions which are imperceptible except through the 
assistance of experts and specialised technology (Beck, 1992; Tsoukas,1999). In 
contrast to earlier forms of risk, the disposal of the HCB poses risks at a global level 
acting far beyond the immediate vicinity (Goldblatt, 1996). As is typical for the Risk 
Society, the disposal of the HCB is perceived to be more threatening because of 
community resentment at a history of community deception by ICI/ Orica. It is seen to 
reflect the ongoing ‘organised irresponsibility’ of government and corporate 
stakeholders. As community representatives Hillier et al argue (this volume: page 2): 
‘All these levels of government allowed Orica/ ICI to continue making the products 
which were creating this toxic waste’. 
 
Many of the theorised characteristics of the Risk Society decision-making relate to high 
levels of uncertainty concerning the level of risk. The Geomelt process proposed by 
Orica for disposal of the waste has many uncertainties including the nature and extent of 
the emissions from that amount of HCB and the length of time for its disposal.  This 
uncertainty and unpredictability is a central feature of reflexive modernisation (Boyne, 
2003) which is driving the move towards the ‘Risk Society.’ Such unpredictability 
makes it unlikely that the Geomelt procedure can be insured; Orica's survival as a firm 
is perceivably threatened.  The hallmark of the Risk Society is the dissolution of 
institutions that once operated without their legitimacy being questioned (Goldblatt, 
1996). In this case, we hear members of the Botany community questioning whether 
issues of insurance and liability are the underlying reasons for the ICI head office 
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disposing of its Australian operation and could result in Orica terminating its business 
operations in the future (Hillier et al, this volume).  
 
3.2 Power relations among stakeholders in the allocation of environmental risks 
 
A staged emergence of new conditions of risk and of changing power relations is seen 
in the study. In Stage 2 of the Risk Society, complex 'sub-political' arrangements 
develop outside the representative realm, in an attempt to deal with risks which are 
characteristically ambiguous and readily politicised (Beck, 1999). The events in the 
Orica HCB dispute shows sub-politicization as challenging corporate power (Beck 
,1999: 108); the CPRC putting Orica in a situation where conditions of suspended doubt 
could easily shift to mistrust (McDonell, 1997; Rae and Brown, this volume) Trust and 
reputation are the determinants of acceptability of the disposal technique to the risk 
community. So even though the community, company and government all initially 
welcomed the HCB Plan and its CPRC, in the end this structure challenged both 
corporate and government power. As Hillier et al (this volume) point out, the CPRC 
became a vehicle for informing the wider community and a critical platform from which 
to approach the media and highest levels of national government.  
 
The study shows that new arenas for dispute and agreement, for networking and negotiation, 
are developing as strong shaping forces on toxic risk management. These new social 
arrangements are now sited in local, decentralised, temporary and less structured arenas of 
decision-making such as the new Expert Review Panel and the CPRC. 
 15 
 
The case reflects the dissolution and temporary reforming of boundaries that 
theoretically distinguishes Risk Society from both industrial and postmodern society 
(Beck et al, 2003).For nearly a decade the CPRC attempted to reach a decision on how 
and where to dispose of the waste. The failure of this decision-making highlights 
emergent problems associated with multiple stakeholder decision-making associated 
with responsibility for the risks of disposal . It further highlights boundary disputes over 
Orica’s right to control the decision-making. As Hillier et al (this volume) make clear, 
the community now challenges this right. This aspect of the case plays out Beck’s 
analysis (Beck et al , 2003: 22) of the nature boundaries in the Risk Society – Orica’s 
boundary between its actions and society is no longer so firmly set by a self-determined 
corporate identity. The boundaryless organisation does not just refer to an organisation 
with a more flexible internal structure but one that is required by society to open its 
decision-making to give it a ‘licence to operate’. The boundary is thus under constant 
negotiation – as Beck et al (2003: 22) put it: ‘fictive, conscious and temporary’.  
 
However, the study lends only qualified support to the Risk Society Stage 2 concept that 
power relations are mainly concerned with the distribution of risk. The local residents 
display a lack of trust in Orica sourced not only in the firm's failure to manage 
environmental risks responsibly but in a history of adversarial relations with industry.  
Until relatively recently, government and industry were able to maintain their position 
of 'organised irresponsibility' (Beck, 1992) concerning toxic risks. Various urban policy 
decisions described by James ( this volume) illustrate the attempts by government and 
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industry to mask the origins and consequences of late industrialisation - the hallmark of 
organised irresponsibility (Goldblatt, 1996). The period of indecision over the disposal 
of the waste between 1997 and 2004 indicates the progressive paralysis of traditional 
forms of representative government in terms of their capacity to manage the heightened 
public awareness concerning such risks. The episode illustrates Beck's point (1995) that 
the outcomes of 'sub-political ' forms of decision-making will be ineffectual if made 
subservient to traditional forms of government. Even though the Commission of Inquiry 
was thought to be the final court of review, it was overturned. It was not until the 
Independent Panel of 2004 recommended and gained Ministerial agreement, that Orica 
accepted that the waste not be destroyed on site. Taking on the challenge proposed by 
Beck (1992; 1995) it is clear that only a completely new set of political conditions will 
enable the threats from chemical technology to be forestalled. 
 
The stalemate in decision-making supports Beck’s theoretical proposition that 
congestion is the key source of citizen power in such disputes. With a situation where 
even the state government member for Botany was questioning the decision-making 
process (Hillier et al, this volume), the case illustrates how conflicting claims by a few 
central actors from the reflexive risk community, exemplified by the CPRC, can 
paralyse representative government and challenge its legitimacy, thereby contributing to 
the erosion of modern social institutions.  Our case highlights the inherent paradox of 
‘organised irresponsibility’ - as Goldblatt puts it (1996), even though the organisations 
that are the source or cause of hazards, such as Orica or ICI, may have the true sense of 
the likely implications of their actions, the demonstration of proof lies in the hands of 
those afflicted (Goldblatt, 1996).   
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A key tenet of Risk Society theory is that citizens become more preoccupied with the 
distribution of risk than with the distribution of wealth; this becomes the source of 
conflict, between industry and industry, as well as between local communities and 
industry.  The difference between classical modernity and reflexive modernity is the 
change in focus from wealth and power towards a society characterised by risk and 
uncertainty (Boyne, 2003). Intersectoral disputes were initially evident in the 
disagreement, between Orica and nearby breakfast food manufacturer Kellogg, which 
surfaced at the Commission of Inquiry (Jensen-Lee, this volume). However, the 
perceived breaches of trust between the two corporations now appear more easily 
resolved than those between the local residents and the corporation: In recent 
manoeuvrings, Kellogg has declined to align itself with residents and Botany Council in 
oppositional campaigning, preferring instead to make its own representations to 
government, and apparently dealing directly with Orica behind the scenes. Such recent 
cooperation between the companies belies Risk Society concepts of a society 
characterised by an over-riding preoccupation with risk. 
 
The study does not support Risk Society arguments which link high levels of 
uncertainty to high levels of influence from mediatised systems. It appears national 
actors with high symbolic capital (Tsoukas, 1999) are needed for the influence to be 
generated. Greenpeace's minimal participation in the Orica debate has been one 
influence on the level of public awareness of the dispute, keeping it at the local level. 
Further, the risk issue has lost its global significance in the public eye, since to date 
recommendations by decision-makers have supported a local, decentralised solution of 
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disposal on site. Even the making of a nationally screened documentary film was 
prompted by the desire, on the part of the film’s director, to explore a local or grass 
roots response to globalisation, and to explain ‘how civil society works’, rather than to 
shift the HCB debate into a national arena. 
 
This appears to be one of the downsides of the individualization of society.  The 
individual actor does not have the power to enforce change over a large problem, as the 
aggregation of consequences at a macro-level proves to be too much for smaller 
stakeholders. The case thus plays out Beck et al’s (2003) characterisation of a complex 
multiplicity of networks and subject boundaries, of individuals, collectives and 
institutions which is inherently difficult to coordinate; one of the associated features in 
reflexive or second modern society. 
 
3.3 Role played by expert knowledge 
 
The changing and ambiguous role assigned to science in the Risk Society is borne out in 
the events of the study. We see a shift from the pre-1980s scenario where science 
legitimates the externalising of environmental costs by industry to a situation where 
local knowledge, developed as a result of the individualization of risk, can 
authoritatively challenge both corporation and government assessments of safety.  The 
ambiguity lies in the fact that while the uncertainties associated with the disposal have 
resulted in an increased reliance by the local risk community on scientific experts, this 
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dependence is parallelled by an emergent distrust.  This is characteristic of the Risk 
Society, where expert knowledge loses its privileged position (Boyne, 2003).   
 
Reflexivity is evident in that local members of the community did challenge the 
opinions of experts, engage in the decision-making process and construct their own 
expertise. Their membership of the CPRC and the actions taken in order to fulfil these 
responsibilities raised their awareness of risks associated with toxic chemicals and led a 
number of the community to revise their opinion of institutions previously perceived as 
legitimate, such as the state and national governments and scientific expertise.  In 
Beck’s analysis of Risk Society (eg 1992), the negative impacts of industrial processes, 
such as the community issues of dealing with toxic waste, acts to challenge the 
assumptions of modernity that science and traditional institutional mechanisms could 
avert the negative impacts of industrialisation. The challenge to the consensus or closed 
circle of experts, such as the chemical engineers of Orica and the external advisor paid 
for by Orica, was conflict over knowledge. The CPRC became a polarised network in 
dissent concerning the knowledge-based appraisal of risk, illustrating processes of ‘non-
linear’ or reflexive modernisation (Beck, 1998: 96).  According to Beck, the shift from 
liner to non-linear modernisation occurs when closed or homogeneous experts groups 
can no longer manage to exclude other forms of knowledge (Beck, 1998). 
 
The case also illustrates Beck’s analysis of the relationship between knowledge and 
trust. As Orica's communications have not generated the symbolic capital needed to 
convince local residents in the discursive struggles over the disposal on site. Scientific 
 20 
knowledge did not ensure trust in the 'external' experts brought in as EIS consultants, or 
as contributors to the Commission of Inquiry. Indeed, as Jensen-Lee points out (this 
volume), the various community and environmental group submissions to the 
Commission of Inquiry were united in their expressed distrust of Orica’s framing of 
Geomelt as ‘safe, in control’ and therefore of low risk’). Also, when ‘independent’ 
expertise was lent to residents (Healy, this volume), this was no guarantee of trust in 
science, since residents dismissed their own experts’ findings as tainted by Orica’s 
apparent appropriation of his advice (Rae and Brown, this volume). 
 
Playing out Giddens' (1994) understanding of reflexivity, 'expert opinion' had marshalled an 
attempt to reorder and redefine the conditions of the production of toxic risk by chemical 
technology in the service of corporations such as Orica. The corporate norm that accepted 
the externalising of such risks was challenged. 
 
3.4 Public participation, policy and regulation 
 
The events of the study broadly follow the pattern traced in Table 1, showing a shift from the 
command and control legislation pre-1980s to the largely symbolic attempts at reform during 
the 1980s to a regulatory regime which incorporates reflexivity as a key goal. The National 
Advisory Body and the National Waste Management Plans formulated by the Australian 
Government for the disposal of the waste in the 1990s are examples of formalised reflexive 
regulation which are designed to enable reflection and to generate a self- regulatory system 
for the management of the waste disposal.  
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The protagonists in the risk community demonstrate the individualized reflexivity 
characterized for the Risk Society (Beck, 1999; Giddens, 1994). In this case, with the 
state government not perceived as either capable or willing to manage the risks 
associated with the disposal, or to contribute resources, the citizens see themselves as 
responsible.  The blame is projected outwards as reflexivity and also internalized as 
individualization (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003). The Botany residents, members of the 
CPRC, are reflexive, but highly individualised. Indeed, supporting Beck's point (1997), 
structures such as the CPRC force the local community to take responsibility for 
managing the risk. But in this case the local community is not empowered by such 
structures as Beck envisaged (1997). Empowerment is linked to credibility and 
legitimacy of knowledge claims as well as to the necessary economic resources enabling 
democratic processes such as intra-group communication; here the individualized 
reflexivity of the local actors has been easily portrayed by their opponents in the 
discursive struggle as NIMBY (Hillier et al, this volume).  
 
The study indicates a staged shift in corporate accountability. The Orica episode reveals 
a key player in the chemicals sector in Australia struggling to deal with new issues of 
accountability. Reflexive citizens expect more from corporations than new products or 
economic return (Giddens, 1994). As Rae and Brown point out (this volume), the 
Botany area, with its long history of industrial accidents and associated lack of trust was 
a fertile ground for the development of such a community.  The establishment of the 
National Waste Management Plans by the Australian Government in the 1990s marked an 
attempt by the national government to ensure accountability. Heightened public perception 
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of the risks associated with HCB disposal has forced the previously dominant corporate 
and governmental interests to delegate authority to the 'sub-political' realm. Rather than 
the regulatory agency steering and supervising the decision-making, with the Orica 
episode, the CPRC took on a role new for the public in this dispute: to review and 
advise, including monitoring of the implementation plan (Rae and Brown, this volume).  
As Benn and Jones argue (this volume), Orica's managers perceive their new situation 
of accountability to the CPRC as a newly threatening source of risk. Beyond the 
understanding of the increasing importance of symbolic capital in such conditions of 
increased corporate uncertainty and transparency, reflexive modernisation and Risk 
Society theory has a limited understanding of contemporary shifts in corporate 
accountability, neglecting, for instance, the process of identity creation and its 
implications for 'sub-political' decision-making on risk. The Orica episode shows each 
of the actors intent on image construction, each aware of the importance of credibility in 
the discursive 'sub-political' arena. Orica's determination to construct an image for itself 
as a corporate citizen of the Botany community does not align with its unreconstructed 
internally perceived identity as a technoscientific organization. Orica attempted to 
change its image and to break down the fortress-like barriers between itself and its 
stakeholders. But strong cultural aspects associated with its longterm identity did not 
change. The non-alignment of corporate identity and image is a major source of the 
distrust evident in the dispute. In this sense, identity is a key factor influencing this 
decision-making, one that was not explored by Beck in his earlier writings.  
 
Beck’s interpretation of individualization theory is fruitful as a means of understanding 
the events of this case (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Orica, the company, is the 
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result of individualization, formed as the result of the 'vertical disintegration' of ICI Ltd 
as the firm outsourced its governance functions (Lash, 2002).  As Bauman (2002) and 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have argued, individualization means disembedding 
from specified roles and functions without re-embedding. However, the struggle within 
the CPRC indicates the importance, somewhat neglected by these writers, of identity in 
the disembedding/ re-embedding process. So we see the discourse of the local residents 
drawing on Orica’s (or ICI’s traditional identity as the authoritarian employer. In the 
words of Hillier et al (this volume: page 5): ‘Botany residents had never won before but 
this company was to be made more transparent through this issue’   Orica looks back to 
its identity as the hierarchical, technoscientific firm, resorting to old patterns of 
'industrial rational control' and the 'revolving door' between science and industry in its 
positivist perspective on risk assessment (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994; Beder, 2001).  
The Orica case displays evidence of reflexivity, the process that is driving the move to 
the Risk Society; therefore perhaps we are witnessing the progress towards the Risk 
Society, but we have yet to arrive at the destination. 
 
The emphasis placed by all stakeholders on constructing and maintaining their identity 
as individual actors, has meant that the various bureaucratic decision-makers, Orica, 
government bodies, other corporations, and the various NGOs, have focussed on 
'consultation  - not participation' (Jensen-Lee, 2003: 38). Effectively, it is the struggle 
for identity formation which has lessened the democratization of risk, so much a feature 
of the optimistic predictions for the Risk Society. 
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For example, Greenpeace's identity is of an international environmentalist organisation. 
Its support for local activists is therefore compromised by its long term and very public 
opposition to the transport of toxic waste and thus implicit support for disposal on site. 
The identity of the local community groups and residents is strongly personified in the 
leading activist - a very local personality. This has enabled the opposition to disposal on 
site to be characterised as NIMBY by other stakeholders. 
 
Most importantly, however, the extent to which structures such as the CPRC can go 
beyond creating congestion and facilitate a more democratic allocation of environmental 
risks appears dependent on the financial resources available to the community members. 
Access to scientific and technological expertise was an economic, rather than a 
discursive issue. In this sense, the study raises questions of environmental justice, and 
economic or class concerns in the determination of risk, challenging the claim that 




This paper broadly supports key propositions of Risk Society theorists. These include the 
characteristics of new forms of risk and the role played by scientific knowledge in risk 
disputes. Lay actors, in this instance the local residents of the Botany area around the Orica 
chemicals plant, show an increasing preparedness to engage with the technical debate on 
toxic risk, and to challenge the status of scientific expertise. This aspect of the study supports 
Risk Society proponent's claim that the reflexivity of modernity empowers laypeople to 
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challenge established forms of expertise (Beck, 1999; Giddens, 1991); at the same time these 
actors display an acceptance of the value of technical expertise (Bauman, 1993). They reflect 
a key precept of the Risk Society: the development of an individualised reflexivity based on 
the need to protect oneself against the risk-inducing actions of government, science and 
industrial development (Bauman, 1993). But is the reflexivity of the Risk Society radical 
enough to challenge and overturn the taken-for-granted assumptions which community, 
corporate and other organizational actors hold about the industrial phase of society 
(Pollner, 1991)? Charged with monitoring their own safety through the establishment of the 
CPRC, the risk community studied here becomes necessarily concerned with the local 
effects of the disposal of HCB, rather than a broad-ranging and radical socio-political 
critique of the conditions and effects of industrialization (Pollner, 1991).  
 
However, the case clearly shows the staged development of a 'sub-political' arena in 
which the legitimacy of corporate and government actors is challenged and decision-
making paralysed. As Risk Society theorists have argued, we see that the new 
legitimacy accorded to the knowledge-based discourse of lay actors in 'sub-political' 
decision-making arenas can break the axis of power between corporation and 
government characteristic of industrial society. The increasing influence of the self-
determining, non-representative 'sub-political' arena emerges as a strong theme. But the 
study also indicates that Beck's predictions concerning the empowering aspects of self 
determining 'sub-political' arrangements are overly optimistic. Not only does the 
individualized reflexivity described here not aim for profound challenge to the 
rationality of industrial society, but the responsibilities of the local risk community, 
thrust on them through the CPRC, in combination with the lack of strong public support 
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from the international environmental NGOs, have meant that the local residents have 
been branded as NIMBY. Loss of power in the discursive struggle is the result. It seems 
the outcomes of 'sub-political' decision-making in reflexive modernization are 
dependent on the relationship between the individualized reflexivity of local actors and 
the more radical, global perspective associated with global organisations such as 
Greenpeace. The importance of localism emerges strongly in the study; yet as a concept 
is missing from Risk Society analysis of 'sub-politics'.  
 
Other researchers have argued that key themes in the communications between 
stakeholders in the siting of hazardous waste facilities are identity disruption, mistrust 
and polarization (Welcomer, Gioia and Kilduff, 2000). This paper, too, shows the 
influence of such postmodern themes on stakeholder communication in the 'sub-
political' arena concerning risk, particularly the polarising effect that individualised 
image construction has on the stakeholders. It highlights the implications of lack of 
alignment between image and identity for the development of distrust and conflict, in 
turn preventing a more participative resolution. Actors in the CPRC dispute are seen to 
be constructing and maintaining their image and their symbolic capital as individual 
actors to an extent that prevented more participatory decision making: Orica as a 
technoscientific firm, the community members as representative of local interests, and 
Greenpeace as the international NGO, identified with the campaign against the transport 
of toxic waste. One of the strongest points of affirmation for Beck's theory of 'sub-
politics' is that of all the major stakeholders, it is the national government which is least 
involved in the decision-making after the initial Plans were formulated. State 
 27 
government, too, has preferred to devolve responsibility for forming (as opposed to 
making) its decision to external consultative committees, such as the new Panel.  
 
Secondly, the study highlights some important issues for organizational survival that are 
not dealt with either in Risk Society theory or in recent studies of organizational 
progress towards broader stakeholder engagement. We see the possibilities for loss of 
organizational legitimacy, if internally conceived identity and externally perceived 
image are not aligned in their negotiations on the allocation of environmental costs 
(Melawar and Jenkins, 2002; Scott and Lane, 2000). Both Orica and government have 
lost credibility as a result of this dispute. The self-perception of Orica, based in 
technoscientific rationality, is not aligned with its newly determined external image of 
transparent communicator. Given the difficulties in managing employee identification 
with a change in corporate identity (Andriopoulos and Gosti, 2001; Meijs, 2002), it is 
not surprising Orica's identity has remained that of a technoscientific organisation. 
Orica's problem is that in a reflexive community technoscientific status no longer 
legitimises the creation of risk. 
 
Government also wears two faces in its involvement in the dispute, relating to the 
different roles played by the national and state governments. Despite early advances 
made at the national level in the participative development of the National Plans, the 
current stalemate is a result of a lack of alignment between the nationally set agenda and 
the capability of the state government to carry it through. Greenpeace, on the other 
hand, keeps its image and identity as an international campaigner against the transport 
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of toxic waste firmly in alignment. The theme of identity is one of the post-modern 
condition, reflecting the shrinking importance of unitary and centralising themes. The 
influence of such postmodern themes as localism and identity challenges the neo-
modernist focus on risk argued for in Risk Society theory.  
 
Overall this study demonstrates the fundamental incompatibility of the existing 
decision-making tools of representative governments and silo-like bureaucracies with 
the political pressures associated with issues of democratic access to knowledge, trust 
and individualised reflexivity evident in the ongoing dispute over the disposal of the 
HCB waste. Yet these structures still wield the ultimate control because of their capacity 
to address resource imbalances. The lack of trust between the firm and the local 
community and the unwillingness of the local community to bear the risk of toxic waste 
management on behalf of the collective demonstrates the issues of governance emerging 
in the individualised, Risk Society. Governments, corporations and NGOs have become 
increasingly concerned with issues of credibility, trust and consent working within the 
'sub-political' arena, a concept drawn from Risk Society theory which the study shows 
to have considerable validity. In further work, it would be fruitful to analyse the 'sub-
political' arrangements between these stakeholders according to the way language 
constitutes multiple stakeholder negotiations concerning risk (Putnam and Fairhurst, 
2001). 
 
In this era of individualization, there are few support programs for groups low in 
cultural or knowledge capital who must now manage their own safety in relation to 
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environmental hazards. So in the end, we have to take a major point from Beck, that of 
the fading of the state, still determined to cling to the reins of power, but not prepared to 
take the risk in decision-making when faced with individual corporations, communities 
and NGOs determined to protect their own reputation or image. For corporations who 
have built their success on an internal identity linked to the surety of values such as 
technoscientific credibility there are major questions of survival in a risk-averse and 
litigious society. The challenges for the democratic state in achieving the local, 
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Table 1: Factors guiding multiple stakeholder decision-making 
 Industrial society Stage 1 of the Risk Society Stage 2 of the Risk Society 
Perceived type and source of risk Naturally occurring threats; fatalistic 
acceptance of natural disasters 
Increasing uncertainty concerning 
effects of scientific advances and 
technological innovation  
Through increased influence of 
mediatised systems, recognition that 
science and technology may create 
unknown dimensions of risk  
Power relations among stakeholders 
in the allocation  of environmental 
risks 
Traditional political arrangements of 
representative democracy ; 
Unquestioning support for 
technological development and 
modernisation; conflict concerning 
distribution of wealth; 'organised 
irresponsibility' by government, 
corporation, law and science; 
Social protest raises awareness and 
uncovers areas of risk; hazards begin 
to develop as political subjects; 
challenges to existing hegemony of 
science, technology and business 
interests; institutional failure; Social 
protest  from the margins of 
corporatist arrangements; struggle of 
Individualised reflexivity; 
emergence of sub-politics; 
ecological issues and large scale- 
hazards come to dominate political 
and moral arenas; conflict over 
distribution of risk; conflicting 
claims by the array of organisations 
within the sub-political arena 
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competition between corporations; 
conflict between capital and labour 
 
outsiders  to be heard paralyse decision-making on risk; 
Conflict over accountability and 
distribution of risk; industry 
confronting industry over risk 
Public participation, policy and 
regulation 
Command and control; licence to 
pollute; Corporations responsible to 
shareholders; compliance with 
legislation 
The emergence of symbolic 
legislation; Compliance according to 
voluntary standards such as 
Responsible Care 
Reflexive regulation - formal and 
informal, enables individual choice 
concerning risk; Corporations 
negotiating with citizen advisory 
committees 
Role of expert knowledge in 
decision-making 
Legitimation of organised 
irresponsibility 
Drawn in to support industry and 
representative democracy against 
emerging challenges to their 
authority 
Expert science is challenged; 
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